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The Making of Transnational Contract Law
GRALF-PETER CALLIESS"
ABSTRACT
The definition and creation of contract law is entrenched in a common under-
standing of the strong role of the modern state in the administration ofjustice. This ar-
ticle argues that this understanding is currently subject to afundamental transformation
as a result of the increasing demand for legal certainty in cross-border transactions.
Traditional concepts ofprivate international law, mainly the law of conflicts and mul-
tilateral treaty harmonization, have proven unable to keep pace with globalization, al-
lowing private actors to step in and gain a dominant position in providing legal services
to international commerce. The resulting privatization of lawmaking leads to con-
cerns regarding the legitimacy of transnational contract law. This paper suggests using
the concepts of "rough consensus" and "running code" to reconceptualize the ideas of
democratic lawmaking under the rule of law in order to adapt them to the reality of
transnational lawmaking.
"We reject: kings, presidents and voting.
We believe in: rough consensus and running code."
-DAVID CLARK'
"The final word always rests with state law;
whatever it fails to authorize has no prospect of
recognition-especially within a democratic state."
-CHRISTIAN VON BAR
2
*Dr. iur., Professor for International and Comparative Commercial Law, Law Department, Uni-
versity of Bremen, Germany, calliess@web.de. This paper has profited a lot from research con-
ducted together with Peer Zumbansen at the Collaborative Research Center 597, 'Transformations
of the State' at the University of Bremen in summer 2006. 1 wish to thank Harry Bauer for his help
in translating parts of the text into the English language.
1. DAVID D. CLARK, A CLOUDY CRYSTAL BALL: VISIONS OF THE FUTURE 19 (1992).
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As a matter of fact, lawyers from all jurisdictions know what contract law is
and how it is made. Although not explicable in a definite theory and despite differ-
ences regarding the relative weight of legislation compared to judicial lawmaking,
this knowledge is entrenched in a common understanding of the strong role of the
modern state in the administration of justice. In this article I argue that this com-
mon sense currently is subject to a fundamental transformation. As globalization
has led to a shift in the legal needs of contract law consumers, the demand for legal
certainty in cross-border transactions has increased. Section I explores this transi-
tion. Section II discusses how traditional concepts of private international law,
mainly the law of conflicts and multilateral treaty harmonization, have proven un-
able to keep pace, allowing private actors to step in and gain a dominant position in
providing legal services to international commerce. The resulting privatization of
lawmaking leads to concerns regarding the legitimacy of transnational contract law.
The new forms of lawmaking that can be observed in the transnational legal arena
cannot be realigned with the traditional concepts of legitimacy of the constitutional
state, nor is it appropriate to fall back on the even more out-dated concepts of natural
or customary law. Rather it is necessary to reconceptualize the ideas of democratic
lawmaking under the rule of law in order to adapt them to the reality of transna-
tional lawmaking. In section III, I suggest that the concepts of "rough consensus"
and "running code" are potential candidates in this endeavor.
I. CONTRACT LAW AND GLOBALIZATION
Commerce, defined as the marketing of goods and services, is dependent on
a tremendously complex set of institutions, a very basic one being the enforcement
of contractual commitments as a means for the voluntary exchange of property
rights. The latter comprises not only substantive norms, i.e., contract law in a nar-
row sense, but procedural arrangements for dispute resolution and enforcement
as well.3 Since the welfare of modern Western societies is based on economic
growth, there is a public interest in fostering commerce by providing efficient in-
stitutions for contract enforcement, at least in the market economies of Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. This was
one reason why rising nation states in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
3. See generally Gillian K. Hadfield, The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Com-
mitments, in HANDBOOK OF NEw INSTITUTIONAL EcoNoMics 175 (Claude Menard & Mary M.
Shirley eds., 2005) (discussing various enforcement mechanisms available to support contractual
commitments).
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modernized their legal systems by providing reliable public legal services with re-
gard to dispute resolution and enforcement, and, in Continental Europe, by en-
acting codifications of substantive commercial and procedural law.
4
However, public interest in a flourishing economy does not necessarily imply
that the state takes over the sole responsibility for the provision of legal certainty
in the three dimensions of legislating, adjudicating, and enforcing. Institutions
that support contractual commitments may also be provided by means of private
ordering5 or private law making.6 Generally speaking, private ordering takes place
"in the shadow of law,"7 i.e. private and public governance mechanisms work as
supplements which are mutually dependent and reinforce each other. The relative
weight of public and private ordering in the governance of contractual relations is
subject to variations in time and space, a fact that is reflected in the eye-catching
title The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, for example.8
There are, however, situations where private ordering substitutes for public
contract law. In "[c]ircumstances where state law is 'very costly, slow, unreliable,
corrupt, weak, or simply absent,"' (lawlessness), parties simply have no choice but
to employ private ordering to support otherwise problematic exchanges.9 Differ-
ent private governance mechanisms, namely social norms, alternative dispute res-
olution, and social sanctions, may be bundled into effective private regimes or
private legal systems in order to allow parties to transact.' This happens not only
in the absence of state support, for instance in less developed countries or transfor-
4. For a discussion on the process of the nationalization of commercial law, see A. CLAIRE
CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLO-
BAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 141-179 (2003) (Cambridge Studies in Int'l Relations, Series No. 90,
2003); JAMES OLDHAM, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE ACE OF MANSFIELD 79-106 (2004); FRANZ
WIEACKER, A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LAW IN EUROPE: WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO GERMANY
363-70 (Tony Weir trans., 1995).
5. E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
126-132 (1991); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Barak D. Richman, Firms,
Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 2328, 2338-48 (2004).
6. E.g., David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIo ST. L.J. 371 (2003).
7. AVINASH K. DIxiT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GOVERNANCE 10
(2004); Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Governance, 95 AM. EcoN. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.)
1, 14 (2005).
8. P. S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (1979). For a detailed analysis
of this concept, see Peer Zumbansen, The Law of Society: Governance Through Contract, 14 IND. l.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191 (2007).
9. DixIT, supra note 7, at 3.
10. See generally Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The Evolution of Private
Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2004); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the
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mation states, but occasionally also in order to opt out of a public legal system
which is perceived as inefficient."
The situation is quite similar when it comes to cross-border commerce. When
compared to domestic commercial transactions, public contract enforcement in-
stitutions are quite weak because additional uncertainties arise with regard to
questions such as which court has jurisdiction, which national contract law that
court shall apply, and whether a resulting judgment will be enforced in another
nation state. Moreover, national courts are said to be ill-equipped with regard to
expertise, language capabilities, costs, and length of procedure, a reason why in-
ternational commercial arbitration has successfully established a dominant posi-
tion on the market for cross-border dispute resolution."
In fact, many scholars contend that one can observe the evolution of a global
private regime for international commerce,'3 i.e. a New Law Merchant. 4 Con-
tested as this thesis may be,'5 recent findings of empirical research on the institu-
tional organization of cross-border commerce suggest that economic globalization
has led to a fundamental transformation of commercial law with regard to the
relative weight of public law and private ordering: "private governance on the
transnational plane becomes much more comprehensive, systematic and
ubiquitous."'6 In the following, I will focus on the investigation of only one aspect
of the introduced problem. It concerns the making of substantive transnational
contract law that emerges beyond both nation states and the multilateralism of
international law.
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1724, 1725 (2001); Gillian K. Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, REG., Spring 2001, at 40.
11. E.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 135, 151 (1992).
12. See Bruce L. Benson, To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question, 8 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 91,
91-93 (1999).
13. "E.g., Gunther Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitu-
tion of Autonomous Sectors?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 71, 72-75
(Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004)
14. Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place-A 21st Century
View of Transnational Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1, 19-22 (Klaus
Peter Berger ed., 2001).
15. See, for example, the analysis of Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the
State, 14 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2007) and Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Com-
mercialArbitration and Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L.J. 400 (2002).
16. Gralf-Peter Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal Cer-
tainty for Globalized Exchange Processes?, in TRANSFORMING THE GOLDEN-ACE NATION STATE 83,
100 (Stephan Leibfried et al. eds., 2007).
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II. THE SUFFERINGS OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW
If one conceives private international law as one component of a global eco-
nomic constitution that provides a regulatory framework for the facilitation of cross-
border commerce, 7 it can be said that it has meandered for more than 200 years and
could easily mislead the legal layperson to the following judgment: "private interna-
tional law is the cause of a problem, for which it regards itself as solution."'"
A. The Nationalization of Contract Law
According to the Continental European model and its concept of the consti-
tutional state, it is taken for granted that private law-like all law-is only con-
ceivable as democratically legitimate parliamentary law. The Anglo-American
common law system recognizes that legislation takes priority over adjudication
(supremacy ofparliament). After more than two centuries of increasingly interven-
tionist private law legislation and adjudication, it is hard to avoid a perception that
does not take the state's claim of the monopoly on legitimate lawmaking as part of
the nation state's deep grammar. As a matter of self-immunization, the state sub-
jects all forms of non-state law to different methods of degradation, namely incor-
poration, delegation, and deference.' 9
During the nineteenth century, the notion that all law is state law in combi-
nation with the heyday of the national idea entailed the nationalization of com-
mercial law.20 While private law was deformalized and modernized by means of
reception and incorporation of the medieval lex mercatoria and the English law
merchant, nineteenth century codification of commercial law-at least in Ger-
many-aimed also at legal unification. Yet, at times the fact remained unnoted
that domestic legal unity came paradoxically at the price of external legal diver-
gence. For only the demise of the tradition of a common (uniform) private law
(ius commune) made it necessary to create a law of conflicts, which as a conse-
17. Manfred E. Streit & Antje Mangels, Privatautonomes Recht undgrenziberschreitende Trans-
aktionen, 47 ORDO 73, 76 (1996).
18. Dieter Schmidtchen, Lex Mercatoria und die Evolution des Rechts, in VEREINHEITLICHUNG
UND DIVERSITAiT DES ZIVILRECHTS IN TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTSRAUMEN 1, 9 (Claus Ott &
Hans-Bernd Schafer eds., 2002) (translated by Gralf-Peter Calliess).
19. Ralf Michaels, The Re-state-ment of Non-State Law: The State, Choice of Law, and the Chal-
lenge from Global Legal Pluralism, 51 WAYNE L. REV. 1209, 1228-37 (2005).
20. See VON BAR & MANKOWSKI,supra note 2, at18-20. For more information on the nationaliza-
tion of commercial law, see sources cited supra note 4.
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quence of legal positivism, could for its part not be conceived as a universal con-
cept. Contrary to the prima facie meaning of "private international law," each
nation state developed its own conflict rules.
B. The Multilateralism of International Law
Already in the second half of the nineteenth century, a countermotion to the
described nationalization of commercial law emerged. Its proponents suggested
establishing a world private law by means of multilateral treaty harmonization
under international law.2 However, more than 100 years of experience have shown
that this strategy is hardly successful; its failure can be ascribed to the punctual
orientation, procedures of multilateral negotiations, and intricate ratification of
international treaties, which do not serve the efficient discussion of issues in con-
tract law.22 From the Hague Conference on Private International Law (1893) to
UNIDROIT (1926) to UNCITRAL (1966), the competent international organi-
zations have produced practically no viable results: for example, the U.N. Con-
vention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods of 1980 (CISG) remained
piecemeal23 and the recent Hague negotiations on a global Judgments Convention
failed miserably.24 Overall, the current take on private law unification under inter-
national law is a disillusioned or even critical one.
25
C. Soft Law and Private Codification
The unification of private law through soft law is a promising alternative con-
cept. 26 That is, international expert commissions develop abstract principles and
21. VON BAR & MANKOWSKI,supra note 2, at 20-32.
22. See Herbert Kronke, UNIDROIT 75th Anniversary Congress on Worldwide Harmonisation of
Private Law and Regional Economic Integration: Hypotheses, Certainties and Open Questions, 8 UNI-
FORM L. REV. 10, 26 (2003).
23. See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, 'Forum Shopping' Despite International Uniform Contract Law Con-
ventions, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 689 (2002).
24. For a discussion on the failure of the global Judgments Convention, see Gralf-Peter Calliess,
Value-added Norms, Local Litigation, and Global Enforcement: Why the Brussels-Philosophy Failed in
the Hague, 5 GERMAN L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1489 (2004).
25. See, e.g., Herbert Kronke, Methodical Freedom and Organizational Constraints in the Develop-
ment of Transnational Commercial Law, 51 Loy. L. REV. 287, 296-97 (2005); Erin Ann O'Hara,
Economics, Public Choice, and the Perennial Conflict of Laws, 90 GEo. L.J. 941, 948-50 (2002).
26. See generally Ulrich Drobnig, Vereinheitlichung von Zivilrecht durch soft law: neuere Erfahrun-
gen und Einsichten, in AUFBRUCH NACH EUROPA: 75 JAHRE MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FUR PRIVATRECHT
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rules of a particular legal area. Such committees can become active within interna-
tional organizations and on private initiative. In the first case, the commissions for-
mally negotiate on behalf of the member states of the relevant international
organizations, with the aim not of concluding an international treaty but of fleshing
out a nonbinding text that is recommended to the Member States for national im-
plementation. This eases consensus-building as it allows every state to abstain from
implementation or to alter a proposed stipulation in individual cases. The 1985 UN-
CITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is regarded as a
particularly successful example; it has been implemented by fifty states and was
used by numerous countries as the standard for the reform of their national arbitra-
tion laws. 7
Private codifications, however, are developed without a formal mandate for
legislation, so participants do not perceive themselves as state representatives; they
argue according to their expertise and own interests. Founded on functional legal
comparison, these formally non-binding results are conceived as the expression of
universally valid legal principles, which constitute the common core of different
national systems of private law. During the 1990s, two codifications of private law,
the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts and the
Lando Commission's Principles of European Contract Law, emerged in the do-
main of contract law. Both codifications not only attempt to function as model
laws but also propose, as a formulation of general legal principles, to be available
both to contractual parties by means of choice of law and to courts in their inter-
pretation of contracts and state private law.2"
D. Transnational Law and Lex Mercatoria
These catalogs of principles, therefore, are conceived as components of the lex
mercatoria, the renaissance of which has been the subject of a lively debate since the
1960s. In 1956, Philip Jessup defined transnational law as "all law which regulates
745 (JUrgen Basedow et al. eds., 2001) (discussing new issues arising from the standardization of civil
law through "soft law").
27. Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL's Model Law on International and Commercial Arbitration:
Present Situation and Future, 21 ARB. INT'L 443, 443 (2005).
28. Ole Lando, Salient Features of the Principles of European Contract Law: A Comparison with
the UCC, 13 PACE INT'L L. REv. 339, 340-42 (2001). See generally Michael Joachim Bonell, Do We
Need a Global Commercial Code?, 106 DIcK. L. REv. 87 (2001) (discussing the type of code needed
to unify international trade law and what its relationship with general contract law should be).
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actions or events that transcend national frontiers."'29 Overcoming the traditional
distinctions between national and international as well as public and private law, his
aim was to establish a jurisprudence encompassing the law of cross-border social
and especially economic phenomena more comprehensively than international law
did, as the latter was seen as increasingly irrelevant and static in the Cold War era.3"
Whereas this approach diverted attention away from legal sources toward the
increasing transnationality of legal matters, almost at the same time Goldman
and Schmitthoff, two European law professors, developed a particular non-state
interpretation of the term "transnational law." Both held the dream that a global
contract law could be established by reviving the lex mercatoria within the juris-
diction of international commercial arbitration.31 Here, transnational (commer-
cial) law constitutes a third category of law beyond the traditional dichotomy of
national and international law.32 The New Law Merchant is conceived as an au-
tonomous legal system beyond the nation state, which is based on general legal
principles, i.e. the common core of national legal systems as explored by func-
tional legal comparison (e.g.,the UNIDROIT principles), and on trade customs
of international merchants as expressed in standardized contract terms (e.g., the
Incoterms or model contract forms of the ICC)." Their application, interpreta-
tion, and development remain with international commercial arbitration.3 4
III. THE LEGITIMATION OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW
There is a heated debate about the existence and legal validity of transna-
tional contract law; with regard to the New Law Merchant there is especially the
issue of its democratic legitimacy.3 This has also become relevant for the recent
29. PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956).
30. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System,
in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 12, 20 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002).
31. For an analysis of this argument, see Zumbansen,supra note 15.
32. KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING CODIFICATION OF THE LEX MERCATORIA 40-43 (1999).
33. Alejandro M. Garro, Rule-Setting by Private Organisations, Standardisation of Contracts and
the Harmonisation of International Sales Law, in FOUNDATIONS AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE LAW 310, 310-17 (Ian Fletcher et al. eds., 2001).
34. See generally Yves Derains, Transnational Law in ICC Arbitration, in THE PRACTICE OF
TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 14, at 43 (discussing the application of transnational law in ICC
arbitration).
35. For a very instructive overview, see Zumbansen,supra note 15.
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contract law project of the European Commission.16 Is transnational contract law
hence illegitimate? This can only be answered by a comparison with traditional
state-made contract law.
A. The Legitimation of State Private Law
"The final word always rests with state law; whatever it fails to authorize has
no prospect of recognition-especially within a democratic state. 37 Typical for
the debate about transnational private law, its arguments become somewhat
opaque under close inspection, as the democratic legitimacy of state private law is
highly overestimated. On the one hand, and despite some positive developments
after the fall of the iron curtain, more than half of the world's population still lives
in illiberal or semi-liberal states where private law can hardly be seen as demo-
cratically legitimated. 8 On the other hand, in liberal states the bulk of private law
is at best democratically legitimized in a formal manner. Common law is judge-
made law and applied, as long as parliament does not legislate in individual cases,
due to legislative refrain from intervention. On a similarly fictitious basis, the
(further) validity of the pre-constitutional German Civil Code (BGB of 1896) was
justified under the German Constitution (Basic Law of 1949) after World War II.
Yet, the Continental European codifications were prepared by experts from min-
isterial bureaucracies as well as academia and their substance was not discussed
by parliament at all; at best, they were amended in individual cases in order to
protect particular interests (e.g., those of beekeepers in section 964 BGB). This
also applies to the Act to Modernize the Law of Obligations, which in 2001 was
pushed through German Parliament in a disgraceful proceeding without any de-
bate due to the expiring term for the implementation of the European Directive
on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods.3 9
With the reference to European Community (EC) legislation, we touch upon
36. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European
Contract Law and the Revision of the Acquis: The Way Forward, COM (2004) 651 final (Oct. 11,2004)
[hereinafter The Way Forward]. For a critique of the contract law project with regard to its demo-
cratic legitimacy, see Gert Bruiggemeier et al., Study Group on Soc. Justice in Eur. Private Law, Social
Justice in European Contract Law: A Manifesto, 10 EUR. L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 653 (2004).
37. VON BAR & MANKOWSKI,supra note 2, at 81.
38. Adrian Karatnycky, Liberty's Expansion in a Turbulent World: Thirty Years of the Survey of
Freedom, in FREEDOM IN THE WORLD: THE ANNUAL SURVEY OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBER-
TIES 2003, at 7 (Adrian Karatnycky, et al. eds., 2003).
39. Directive 1999/44/EC, 1999 O.J. (L171) 12.
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the decisive legitimacy deficit of today's private laws of the EC Member States.
With regard to private law, the German legislator possesses practically no leeway
because, since the 1980s, private law legislation almost exclusively implemented
EC directives. Yet, the German legislator is practically not, and theoretically
hardly, involved in the creation of EC legislation; often it does not take advantage
of its remaining leeway, as it does not recognize its room for maneuver or is mis-
led about it by interested parties. The German Federal Constitutional Court
(Bundesverfassungsgericht) has recently problematized this state of affairs with
regard to the European arrest warrant.40
EC Directive law itself lacks legitimacy entirely if one applies a minimum
standard geared toward a procedure facilitating rational outcomes in the sense of
deliberative democracy. 4' One can, for instance, be reminded of the fact that dur-
ing the debate about the transformation of the European Anti-Discrimination
Directives42 into German law the entire German government, including the cur-
rent Minister of Justice, affirmed its incompetence concerning the Directive's con-
tent; it was argued that the Directives quasi-accidentally "slipped through" and
that responsibility rested with the (meanwhile retired) Minister of Labor Riester,
who had agreed unsuspectingly and without consultation.4 3 That such deep inter-
ventions into the foundations of private law can occur within a democratic state in
such a manner reduces the democracy argument put forward to absurdity.
40. See generally Simone M61ders, European Arrest Warrant Act Is Void-The Decision of the Ger-
man Federal Constitutional Court of 18July 2005, 7 GER. L.J. 45 (2006) (discussing the FCC's opin-
ion declaring the European Arrest Warrant Act unconstitutional and void).
41. For more information on deliberative democracy, see J0RCEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 287 (William Rehg
trans., 1996).
42. Four Directives had to be implemented into German law: Council Directive 2000/43/EC,
2000 O.J. (L 180) 16-22 (implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespec-
tive of racial or ethnic origin); Council Directive 2000/78/EC, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16-22 (establish-
ing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation); Council Directive
2002/73/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 269) 15-20 (amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implemen-
tation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment,
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions,); and Council Directive 2004/113/
EC, 2004 O.J. (L 373) 37-43 (implementing the principle of equal treatment between men and
women in the access to and supply of goods and services).
43. Compare the news coverage in Der Spiegel 18/2005. Burokratie: Weckruffur Prozesshansel,
SPIEGEL DIGITAL, May 2, 2005, http://service.spiegel.de/digas/servlet/find/Dl D- 40254095.
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B. Rough Consensus and Running Code
If, with regard to the above-mentioned private codifications (e.g., the
UNIDROIT Principles), it is argued that their validity resulted from "not ratione
imperii, yet imperio rationis,"44 unnecessary worries about expert domination
over democratic legislation are fostered . 4 Regarding the legitimacy of transna-
tional contract law, the reference to reason remains unsatisfactory as the contents
of normative texts hardly impinge on their mode of action. "Structures are only
real when they are used for linking communicative events; norms, only when
they are quoted explicitly or implicitly .... ,16 Catalogs of general legal principles,
as soft law, do not spring to life until they are applied in concrete cases and, hence,
transformed into respectable hard code. In the legal process the condensation and
confirmation of norms coincide.47 In its directly legitimizing manner, this trans-
formation process is linked back to the law-seeking citizens, a fact which is tradi-
tionally pigeonholed, somewhat imprecisely, as "customary law." In the nineteenth
century, Savigny had qualified the interaction of "peoples' law" and "lawyers'
law" in the emergence of customary law as follows: "law is first created by cus-
toms and popular belief, then by jurisprudence; thus everywhere by quietly work-
ing forces, but not by the will of the legislators."" From a current perspective,
however, this wording requires an update in order to touch upon the legitimation
mode of transnational contract law referred to in our context.
1. Internet Governance: The Legitimation of Open Technical Standards
"We reject: kings, presidents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and
running code."49 In order to safeguard its interoperationability as a network of net-
works, the Internet requires global technical standards, whose development was
44. Ulrich Drobnig, Ein Vertragsrechtfur Europa, in FESTSCHRIFT FUR ERNST STEINDORFF ZUM
70. GEBURTSTAC AM 13. MARZ 1990, at 1141, 1151 (JUrgen F. Baur, Klaus J. Hopt & Peter K.
Mailander eds., 1990) (referencing Kotz) (translated by author).
45. See, e.g., Gert Bruiggemeier et al., supra note 36, at 653-55.
46. NIKLAs LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 46 (1993).
47. For a much more detailed discussion of this concept, see Grailf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive
Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the Civilisation of Private Law, 23 ZEITSCH RI FT
FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOCIE 185 (2002).
48. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, VOM BERUF UNSERER ZEIT FUR GESETZGEBUNG UND RECHTS-
WISSENSCHAFT 13 (1814).
49. CLARK, supra note 1; Joseph Reagle, Why the Internet Is Good: Community Governance
That Works Well (1998) (working draft), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/reagle/
regulation-19990326.html (quoting David Clark).
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carried out by Jon Postel, a California university student, in the 1970s. In order to
maintain the quality of standards and to increase the motivation of globally dis-
persed webmasters for compliance, he developed the Request for Comments (RFC)
procedure."0 For the solution of a particular problem a team leader is appointed,
who posts an RFC on the net. Everyone can digitally participate in the debate; pri-
marily, interested experts from affected groups take part. Generally, standards
should be established not by majority decision but through consensus by delibera-
tion. Yet, in order to keep the debate from losing itself in contradicting alternatives
or from starting all over again, the team leader can state a rough consensus concern-
ing intermediary or final results."1 Such an approximate or "rough consensus" has
three implications: it indicates a) at the social level, a near unanimity among the
participants (i.e., a fairly prevailing opinion), b) at the substantial level, a common
denominator (i.e., a common core) and c) at the time level, a moment of temporari-
ness regarding future improvements (i.e., learning aptitude).52 Where a team has
reached consensus about a new standard, the implementation phase begins, in
which running code again holds three meanings: at first, the usability of a new stan-
dard is tested among a small group (pilot phase) before it is recommended for global
implementation. Thereafter, the Internet community is free to accept or reject the
proposal (recognition phase). Only if a standard has achieved broad acceptance so
that its noncompliance would jeopardize interoperability, would a webmaster lose
her freedom of choice (binding phase). 3 In analogy to IT language, the relevant
standard then resembles a running code that functions in practice and is wide-
spread. The "rough consensus and running code" procedure was later adopted by
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) as well as the World Wide Web Con-
sortium (W3C) and has since been elaborated.5 4
2. Modern Customary Law as Open Social Standard
This procedure is not only suitable for technical standards but can also be ap-
plied to social and legal norms. In a discourse theoretical view, rough consensus
on the side of norm entrepreneurs stands for a deliberative procedure for creating
norms that is geared to the scientific quest for truth. Running code refers to the
recognition of such norms by consensus of all affected on the demand side and the




54. See, e.g., id.
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implementation of a norm in a regulatory competition that is characterized by
network effects.5 Both elements can be found in the production of soft law ac-
cording to international law (UNCITRAL model law) and in the elaboration and
application of private codifications (UNIDROIT and Lando Principles). The
legal principles and fundamental rules inscribed into private codifications have to
be grounded in a wide consensus regarding social, substantial, and time aspects if
they strive to become a running code in practice. Expressed in the choice of law of
such principles, the contractual parties' assent grounds their trust that these prin-
ciples represent a broad accord.
In its result, a running code is not different from customary law. Yet, custom-
ary law has to start at some point. Rough consensus and running code can be seen
as timely interpretations of the production of customary law. With regard to the
legitimacy of transnational contract law, they can serve as elements of a theory of
a "global civil law society," which replaces the "quietly working forces" of the
nineteenth century. 6 Beyond customary law, which is merely bound to consuetudo
and opinio necessitates and state law, which is constituted in formal legislative pro-
ceedings via majority decision, there seems to emerge a new form of legitimate
lawmaking-especially for the supra-national and transnational spaces of action
and communication. 57
3. The Legitimation of the European Contract Law Project
Once a sensibility for innovative modes of legitimate lawmaking has been de-
veloped, traces of the new model can be discovered as well in the European contract
law project: request for comments, rough consensus, and running code. With the
communication of 2001, the action plan of 2003 and the communication of October
20048 the European Commission has initiated an open and transparent process of
discussion, which everyone interested could join by written statement and whose
55. For a discussion on the economic model of competition for social lawmaking, see Amitai
Aviram, A Network Effects Analysis of Private Ordering (Berkeley Program in Law & Econ., Work-
ing Paper No. 80, 2003), available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi ?article = 1079
&context=blewp, and Andreas Engert, Norms, Rationality, and Communication: A Reputation
Theory of Social Norms, 92 ARCHIV FUIR RECHTS- UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE 335 (2006).
56. GRALF-PETER CALLIESS, GRENZUBERSCHREITENDE VERBRAUCHERVERTRAcE 220 (2006).
57. See generally Calliess, supra note 47 (examining the emergence of transnational law and the
need to constitutionalize such regimes).
58. Commission of The European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the
Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law, Brussels, 11.07.2001, COM(2001)
398 final; Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A
More Coherent European Contract Law, Brussels, 12.2.2003, COM(2003) 68 final; Communication
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course and intermediary results are freely accessible through the publication of all
documents on the Internet. 9 The fundamental rules of European contract law shall
at first be consolidated in a nonbinding Common Frame of Reference (CFR); the
development of its draft was assigned to the Joint Network on European Private
Law.6 This network of scholars from all European countries works on the basis of
the common core approach; hence, it attempts to identify the substantial rough con-
sensus of existing European private law directives (the "acquis communautaire") on
the one hand, and the national private laws of Member States through functional
legal comparison on the other hand. At the same time, the European Commission
established a network of practitioners (CFR-net), which shall be involved in the de-
velopment of the CFR. Overall, the CFR is developed with the aim of achieving a
broad consensus on the basis of a wide participation of governments, industry, and
civil society; the involvement of practitioners shall lead to an early recognition of im-
plementation issues (practicability test).6
Once a rough consensus about the CFR is achieved, it could, as a first step, be
published as a (nonbinding) recommendation within the Official Journal of the Eu-
ropean Union. Within commercial intercourse, these rules could be applied as cho-
sen law by parties in arbitration proceedings according to the model of the
UNIDROIT principles. In the context of the reform of the 1980 Rome Convention
on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, the European Commission sug-
gests that contract parties should be allowed to choose particular private codifica-
tions by means of choice of law-having in mind the UNIDROIT principles and
the CFR.62 Thus, the CFR is considered to be developed into a so-called "optional
instrument;" it would be available by choice of law so that state courts would apply
the CFR as law (recommendation phase). Only if enough practical experience with
from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Contract Law and
the revision of the acquis: the way forward, Brussels, 11.10.2004, COM(2004) 651 final.
59. For a compilation of the documents concerning the contract law project, see EUROPA,
Consumer Affairs, European Contract Law, http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/cons int/safeshop/
fair.bus-pract/cont-law/indexen.htm (last visited May 11, 2007).
60. The coordinator of the network, which encompasses different research groups, is Hans
Schulte-N61ke, Professor at the University of Bielefeld. For details, see Joint Network on Euro-
pean Private Law Home Page, http://www.copecl.org/ (last visited June 22, 2007).
61. Compare the considerations about a previous "practicability test" for the CFR. The Way
Forward,supra note 36, at 3.2.2.
62. This is explained in the commentary to Article 3. Commission Proposalfora Regulation of the
European Parliament and the Council on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), at
5, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 15, 2005). For a critique of the choice of non-state law, see Peter
Mankowski, Stillschweigende Rechtswahl und wahlbares Recht, in DAS GRONBUCH ZUM INTERNA-
TIONALEN VERTRAGSRECHT 63 (Stefan Leible ed., 2004).
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this instrument is gained, which depends mainly on the acceptance of the CFR by
contract parties expressed by their choice of law, could the degree of obligation be
raised by a transition from opt-in to opt-out; then the instrument would be applica-
ble like state law even in the absence of a differing choice of law, as is the case with
the CISG.63 The triggered increase of precedent available on the interpretation of
the CFR by state courts will result in a decrease in opt-outs by contract parties. At
the end of the day the CFR may transform into a generally accepted practice by con-
tract parties and their counsels which will be very difficult to avoid even by parties
from non-member states of the EC (binding phase).
To sum up, the European contract law project resembles both the "rough
consensus" and the "running code" method, i.e., the gradual codification and im-
plementation of law dependent on the consent of the addressees of norms.
63. For the definitions of "opt-in" and "opt-out" instruments and an explanation of their rela-
tion to legal choice, see The Way Forward, supra note 36, at 17, 2. The CISG under this definition
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